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1. Introduction
Recent advances in technology [1] have led to a 
persistent need for novel congestion avoidance 
frameworks that suitable to tackle the techni-
cal challenges accompanying future wireless 
networks. Game theory approach [2,3] has 
emerged as a pivotal tool for the design of fu-
ture wireless networks. This is mainly due to the 
need for incorporating decision-making rules 
and techniques into next-generation wireless 
nodes, to enable them to operate efficiently and 
meet the users’ needs in terms of network ser-
vices like congestion and load balancing [4]. 
The key challenge of game theory in a wireless 
network has many problem in finding accu-
rate models and solutions. Existing congestion 
control schemes are not adequate to cope with 
issues such as wireless channels, transmission 
rate, queuing delay and signal to- noise ra-
tio. Game theoretic approach provides a wide 
range of wireless applications such as wireless 
local area networks, multi-hop networks, coop-
erative networks and cognitive-radio networks.
An application of game theory in wireless net-
works pertains to modeling the issue of con-
gestion in wireless network and power control 
[5] in cellular networks. In wireless network, 
researchers have been concerned with the 
problem of designing a mechanism to pre-
vent congestion to increase throughput. In a 
non-cooperative game [6], a number of play-
ers are involved in a competitive situation in 
which, whenever a player makes a move, this 
move has an impact  on the utility of the other 
players. Similarly, in a congestion control game, 
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we have a competitive situation in which the 
transmit packet in a wireless network provide 
impact positively or negatively on the trans-
mission rate. As a result, non-cooperative game 
was designed in solving a congestion control in 
the wireless network. Congestion control used 
game theory mechanism to design next-gener-
ation congestion-free wireless networks. Game 
theory has emerged in a novel application area 
including wireless and signal processing com-
munities.
We proposed a novel scheme, reducing con-
gestion-free alternate routing path for wire-
less Networks, which uses a Stackelberg game 
theory model (SGTM); its goal is to reduce the 
congestion using correlated equilibrium. Dif-
ferently from the above existing methods, this 
work reveals the best reaction to select a con-
gestion-free alternate path. 
The remainder of the paper contains five sec-
tions. Section 2 summarizes existing work and 
highlights the importance of the proposed 
work. Section 3 describes our Stackelberg game 
theory model in wireless network to provide 
congestion-free network. Section 4 presents 
our simulation results and a relevant perfor-
mance analysis. Finally, Sections 5 presents our 
conclusions and discusses future direction.
2 Related Works
The issue of congestion in wireless networks is 
very complex that includes measures taken for 
manipulating the traffic within the network in 
order to prevent congestion. Hierarchical Tree 
Alternative Path (HTAP) algorithm [7] creat-
ed a dynamic alternative path by performing 
minor computations to mitigate congestion in 
wireless sensor networks. Saad, et al [8] pro-
posed a coalition formation game with trans-
ferable utility for forming coalitions among the 
Road Side Users (RSU). In coalition formation, 
each RSU take an individual decision to join or 
leave a coalition, depending on its utility. This 
scheme improves the diversity of the informa-
tion circulating in the network.
Pavlos, et al. [9] presented on the bird flock-
ing behavior to coherently move packets to the 
sink to reduce congestion in wireless sensor 
networks. The synchronized group behavior of 
birds’ flocks is mimicked in order to control the 
motion of packet flocks through a network of 
constrained sensor nodes. This scheme avoided 
congestion regions and dead node zones. Pra-
jakta, et al., [10] presented a Congestion Avoid-
ance and Route Allocation using Virtual Agent 
Negotiation to provide cooperative route-allo-
cation decisions in the network. Anastasopou-
los, et al., [11] proposed an adaptive coding 
and modulation (ACM) mechanism for TCP 
throughput maximization. It investigated the 
speed of convergence on various physical-layer 
metrics that provide stability of ACM scheme. 
Most theoretical research on routing games 
[12] in wireless networks has so far dealt with 
reciprocal congestion effects between routers.
Ng and Seah [13] presented Game theoretic ap-
proach for improving cooperation in wireless 
multi-hop networks. This scheme obtain clause 
for collusive packet forwarding, and truthful 
routing broadcasts for wireless multi-hop envi-
ronment. Niyato, et al. [14] proposed a Markov 
chain dynamic model to obtain a stable coa-
litional structure. The authors also presented 
the well-defined merge and split mechanisms 
for a distributed environment to maximize the 
social welfare of all vehicular users. Saad, et al. 
,(2010) [15] presented a hedonic coalition for-
mation game among the secondary base sta-
tions (SBSs) that take an individual decision 
to join or leave a coalition while maximizing 
its utility resulting in improve the cooperative 
sensing in Cognitive networks.
Wang, et al. [16] proposed a sensing game 
called as evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) of 
the secondary users. It provides dynamics con-
verge to the ESS that gives the possibility of a 
decentralized implementation and maximize 
the throughput. Yang, et al. [17] presented a co-
operative Nash bargaining power-control game 
to provide network efficiency and user fairness. 
A minimum signal-to-interference-plus-noise 
ratio requirement is employed to provide re-
liable transmission to secondary cognitive us-
ers. Pedro Lopez, et al., [18] presented a hybrid 
method that combination of genetic algorithm 
and the cross-entropy to optimizing the ele-
ments. It is used to predict congestion in the 
network. Paramasivan, et al., [19] a Dynamic 
Bayesian Signaling Game to reduce the mali-
cious node’s utilities in mobile ad hoc networks. 
It reveals the best actions of individual strategy 
to minimize the utilities of malicious nodes in 
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MANETs by analyzing strategy profiles of ma-
licious nodes. 
Ali Hameed and Arkadii Slinko [20] proposed 
weighted hierarchical games that are used for 
secure secret sharing. Shapley value is used as a 
solution of this game for making cooperation. 
Dieter, et al. [21] presented the refined best 
response correspondence of a game for reduc-
ing the payoff by all pure strategies. Previous 
schemes are not perform excel in terms of con-
gestion and maximizing throughput. So, it is 
very much essential to derive congestion-free 
networks for various social welfare networks. 
In this work, we proposed a Stackelberg game 
theory approach to finds a buffer level thresh-
old using correlated equilibrium and also pro-
vide maximum throughput by selection of 
leader and followers. The proposed scheme 
finds alternate paths for maximizing successful 
delivery of packets to destination.
3  Proposed Works
3.1 Wireless Routing-game formation
A wireless network is represented as directed 
graph G=(V,E) G=(V,E) =( ,E) with vertex set V and edge set 
E with undirected. It has source and destination 
set that represents as ( )1 1 i i{(S ,D ) .. S ,D }… . Dif-
ferent players originate from different source 
vertices and pass information to different des-
tination vertices. The path of a wireless network 
is represented as i i ip S D= − . A graph G con-
tains parallel edges, and a vertex that partici-
pate in multiple source–destination pairs. Each 
edge e of a wireless network has a congestion 
cost function ce. The cost of each edge is deter-
mined by both nature (link quality) and players’ 
actions. The cost ce represents a quantity that in-
creases with the network congestion when play-
ers utilize the edge too much. The congestion 
cost function is described as follows in terms of 
congestion parameters ce = (αi , βi).
The utility for a player iu . is devised as the sum 
of the cost over the selected paths, and depends 
on the flows. In the routing game, the strategy is  
for each player is choosing minimal overall cost 
that consider as optimal flow in the network. 
The path between source – destination flow is 
a non-negative vector indexed by the path set 
ip . There are two constraints on the flows and 
paths. First, a player selects multiple paths for 
transmission. The summation of flows over dif-
ferent paths is equal to the player’s source–des-
tination rate. Second, in each vertex, the sum of 
the input flows and the flow generated by this 
vertex is equal to output flows.
In this, independent players interact in the 
network. The total network flows result from 
individual players’ decisions. The graph G was 
formed when player i plays a strategy is  while 
all other nodes maintain their strategies that 
represented as [ ]i 1 i 1 i 1 ks s s ,s s  − − += … … . The best 
response for a player and the Nash equilibrium 
found to analyze the outcome of the game. The 
best response for player is the selection of the 
flow that optimizes its utility, ven that the oth-
er players maintain their strategies. The Nash 
equilibrium is the stable point at which no 
player can unilaterally improve its performance 
by changing its own strategy alone. Atrategy *is  
is the best response for a player that is given by 
Equation (1)
( ) ( )* ii*i i i i s i iss u G ,s u G ,s , s )− −= ≥ ∀  (1)
We formed the wireless network as hierarchical 
level. The network is divided into l hierarchy 
levels based on the distance. In initial network 
stage, each node at a level l selects the near-
est neighbor in level l +1. Each node at level l’ 
transmits packets using the nodes’ strategies at 
level l +1 with different probabilities over time.
3.2 Stackelberg Game Theory Model
In non-cooperative games, a hierarchy among 
the players exists whereby one or more players 
declare their strategies before the other players 
choose their strategies. In such a hierarchical 
decision-making scheme, the declaring play-
ers enforce their own strategies upon the other 
players who are called the leader. The players 
who react to the leader declared strategy are 
called followers. There are multiple leaders and 
multiple followers exist in a network. A leader 
and a follower with their strategy sets are de-
noted by 1s  and 2s , respectively. The leader an-
nounces any strategy to play 1 1s S∈ , the follower 
must respond with a leader’s strategy 2 2s S∈ . The 
congestion of two players p1 and p2 are giv-
en below  for 
 and .
A Strategy *is  is the best response for a player in 
terms of congestion cost function that is given 
by Equation (2)
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A strategy might have many reactions of the 
leader. The reaction set ( )2 1R s  defined for each 
strategy 1 1s S∈ by
( ) ( ) ( ){ }2 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 2R s  s S : u s ,s u s , t ,  s  = ∈ ≥ ∀∈  Eq.(3)
( )2 1R s   is the optimal response or optimal re-
action set of player2 to the rategy 1 1s S∈  of 
player1. A Stackelberg strategy is defined by a 
reaction set to find an equilibrium point with 
hierarchical decision-making. Stackelberg 
game with player1 as the leader, aategy *1 1s  S∈  
is represented as Stackelberg equilibrium strat-






2 2 11 12 2 1
* *
1 1 2 1 1 2 1s R ss Ss R s
min u s ,s max   min  u s ,s u
∈∈∈
=    Eq.(4)
The quantity *1u  is the Stackelberg utility for the 
leader. Similarly, Stackelberg equilibrium strat-
egy for player 2 is just swapped subscripts 1 and 
2.
Stackelberg utility for the leader has a unique 
value that provides hierarchical decision mak-
ing. In Eq.(4), the leader’s Stackelberg strategy 
*
1s   ensures that the leader receive a utility that 
is more than *1u . The optimal response of the 
follower becomes unique for evy strategy of the 
leader, and *1u  becomes the actual leader’s util-
ity when the follower’s reaction set ( )2 1R s  is a 
singleton set for each 1 1s S∈ . 
Leader’s Stackelberg strategy represented as 
*
1 1s  S∈ . The equilibrium wh 
*
1s  is an opti-
mal strategy for the follower in any strategy 
( )* *2 2 1s  R s∈ . Thus, the pair * *1 1 (s ,s ) is a Stackel-
berg solution for the game with player1 being the 
leader, and the utility pair ( ) ( )* * * *1 1 2 2 1 2u s ,s ,  u s ,s  
is the corresponding Stackelberg equilibrium 
outcome.
Let *1u  and 
NE
1u  denote the Stackelberg utility 
and the Nash equilibrium utility for player1 in 
two player finite game, respectively. If the reac-
tion set ( )2 1R s  is a singleton set for all 1 1s S∈  in 
the Stackelberg formulation for a leader.
* NE
1 1u u  ≥  Eq.(5)
The leader improves its utility as per proposi-
tion (5). Whenever the follower has a single op-
timal response for every strategy of the leader, 
then the leader performs the Nash equilibrium. 
This proposition holds if ( )2 1R s  is a singleton 
set for all 1 1s S∈  and not only at the Stackelberg 
strategy *1s  of the leader. Table 1 shows the 
Stackelberg game for two players.
Table 1: Stackelberg game for player1 and player2
U D M
U (3,3) (2,3) (0,2)
D (1,4) (1,3) (4,4)
(D,M) and (U,U) are Nash equilibrium with no 
hierarchy, but (D,M) is the better payoffs for both 
players that yields (4,4). If a player 1 be a leader. The 
leader chooses strategy U, and then the reaction 
set of the follower is ( ) { }2R U U,D= . The Stack-
elberg utility for the leader is *1u 2= . In contrast, if 
the leader chooses D, then *1u 1= . Consequently, 
*
1s U = would be the leader’s Stackelberg strate-
gy, and the Stackelberg utility would be *1u 2= . 
It is depending on whether the follower choos-
es U or D, at the Stackelberg equilibrium. The 
leader achieves either 2 or 3. The game confess 
two Stackelberg equilibrium (U, U) and (U,D) 
with payoffs (3,3) and (2,3), respectively. This 
demonstrates the difference between the Stack-
elberg utility *1u 2=  and the actual utility at the 
Stackelberg equilibrium ( )* *1 1 2 u s ,s , which could 
be either equal to *1u , if the follower plays U, 
or better than *1u  if the follower plays D. The 
Stackelberg equilibrium provides lower utilities 
for the leader and the follower in the best Nash 
equilibrium. We used the Stackelberg solution 
with a single leader and multiple followers. The 
leader’s announced Stackelberg strategy to in-
dicate the point where congestion raised and 
declared that the best strategy to take alternate 
path that provide congestion-free network. 
Figure 1 shows the congestion avoidance path 
with alternate path. The alternate paths P1 and 
P2 were found when congestion was occurring 
in a network.
Figure 1: Congestion avoidance with alternate path
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3.3 Correlated equilibrium
The correlated equilibrium was suitable for 
decision process in between non-cooperation 
and cooperation. A coordinator was helped to 
correlate their actions by sending signals to the 
players. The signal from a coordinator does not 
depend on the individual states that make co-
ordination of actions between the players. The 
correlated equilibrium of players allows utiliz-
ing a joint action profile with a certain prob-
ability. It generates a better Nash equilibrium 
to set the threshold value. A non-cooperative 
strategic game is defined as Eq.(6)
( ) ( )( )i e iG  N,  S   c  i N , u   i N = ∈ ∈   Eq.(6)
The correlated strategy p(s) is a probability dis-
tribution over the strategy profile s S∈ . The 
correlated equilibrium denoted as a strategic 
game G, a correlated strategy ( ) ( )i ip s   p s  ,  s   −=  
is said to be a correlated equilibrium if, for all 
'
i i ii N,s ,s s∈ ∈  and i is   S− −∈  we have 
( ) ( ) ( )
i i
'
i i i i i i i i
s   S




 − ≤ ∑   Eq.(7)
By dividing the inequality Eq.(7) by 








= ∑  and using Bayes’ rule
( ) ( )
1 1
' '
1 i i i i i i i i i
s S




 − ≤ ∀ ∈ ∑   Eq.(8)
This implies that the expected payoff received 
by a player i choosing strategy is  at the corre-
lated equilibrium is greater than or equal to its 
expected payoff for choing any other strategy 
is− . A probability distribution at the correlated 
equilibrium must satisfy the following:
( ) ( )p11 p120 1 5 4 0,− + − ≥   Eq.(9)
( ) ( )p21 p220 1 5 4 0,− + − ≥   Eq.(10)
( ) ( )p11 p210 1 5 4 0,− + − ≥   Eq.(11)






=∑ , 0<= { }i, j p 1, i, j 1, 2≤ ∀ ∈   Eq.(13)
where i, jp  is the probability of player 1 choos-
ing strategy i and player 2 choosing strategy 
j, where { }i, j 1, 2∈  with strategy 1 being stay 
straight, Table 2 shows the Nash equilibrium in 
which strategy ST, and strategy 2 being swerve, 
i.e., strategy S. The first two inequalities repre-
sent the optimality of the distribution for player 
1 by comparing the payoffs for the cases when 
player 1 chooses strategy ST of first inequality 
and S of second inequality. 
Table 2: Pure-strategy Nash Equilibrium
Straight(ST) Swerve(S)
Straight(ST) (0,0) (0 or 1)
Swerve(S) (1 or 0) (0,0)












Similarly, the third and fourth inequalities are 
written for player 2’s case. The last two equa-
tions simply state that i,ip  are probability val-
ues. This system of inequalities admits an in-
finite number of solutions, i.e., correlated equi-
librium. Nonetheless, we find straight forward 
correlated equilibriums in Table 2, 3, 4 and 5. 
In Table 2, we show the two pure-strategy Nash 
equilibrium which are in the correlated equi-
librium set. In Table 3, we show the correlated 
equilibrium which is the mixed-strategy Nash 
equilibrium of this game. This mixed strate-
gy Nash equilibrium dictates that each player 
use each strategy with a probability of 1/2. The 
correlated equilibrium in Table 4 can be in-
terpreted as a congested point. The correlated 
equilibrium in Table 4 yields a better expect-
ed utility than the mixed-strategy Nash equi-
librium. Finally, the correlated equilibrium in 
Table 5 is the one that maximizes the expected 
sum of utilities, obtained by a linear maximi-
zation over the set of correlated equilibrium. 
The set of correlated equilibrium contain an 
infinite number of points. Therefore, it is use-
ful in a congested application to define a metric 
or threshold. We used a correlated equilibrium 
to find the buffer level threshold. The expected 
sum of utilities defined by a correlated strategy 
( )p s  if it satisfies the following conditions:
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( ) ( ) 'p i i i i
i s i N
p s argmax E u , s ,s S  and  i N
∈ ∈
= ∀ ∈ ∀ ∈∑
( ) ( ) 'p i i i i
i s i N
p s argmax E u , s ,s S  and  i N
∈ ∈
= ∀ ∈ ∀ ∈∑  Eq.(14)
In contrast, the max-min criterion attempts to 
find the correlated equilibrium that guarantees 
a minimum expected utility: A correlated strat-
egy ( )p s   satisfying the max-min criterion is 
given by
( ) ( ) 'p i i i i
i s
p s argmax  min E u  s ,s S  and  i N
∈
= ∀ ∈ ∀ ∈
( ) ( ) 'p i i i i
i s
p s argmax  min E u  s ,s S  and  i N
∈
= ∀ ∈ ∀ ∈  Eq.(15)
The correlated equilibrium in wireless net-
works provides a balance between the cooper-
ative solution which requires a lot of overhead 
but can be highly efficient. 
3.4 Alternate routing path 
In buffer-based congestion, congestion is still 
possible to happen when a node receives pack-
ets with a higher rate than it can transmit. In 
a wireless network, all nodes are exactly the 
same. When the buffer of a node starts filling, 
this node has to take action. Each node is able 
to run congestion detection (CD) algorithm. 
When the buffer reaches a buffer-level thresh-
old value or congestion cost value, the CD al-
gorithm starts counting the rate with which 
packets are reaching the node. Since each pack-
et is identified in its packets header, the CD al-
gorithm is aware of all the nodes that transmit 








The CD algorithm is able to calculate the to-
tal receiving rate and compare it with its max-
imum transmission rate ( maxTx ) using Eq. 
(16), When this ratio is large the node sends a 
backpressure message to the nodes that trans-
mit packets through it to search for an alterna-
tive path. The Stackelberg game concept is used 
where a leader and follower is selected. A lead-
er provides a best response strategy to alternate 
path from the congested point. Hence, it is a 
hierarchical network, an upstream node is in-
formed to stop transmitting packets through a 
specific downstream node, it follows the leader 
node’s strategy to transmit or reduce the trans-
mit rate with the same level in comparison with 
the congested node. Subsequently, all upstream 
nodes that reside in a level lower than the con-
gested node update their leader’s strategy that 
this downstream node is congested and avoid 
transmitting any data through this node and 
follows the leader node’s path. Similarly, when 
this downstream node becomes available again, 
it informs the upstream nodes accordingly. It 
offered the topology control for source based 
hierarchical tree, each node is able to inhibit 
the transmission of packets through itself and 
also it is able to join the first available shortest 
path, after path alternation.
3.5 Monitoring congestion situation
A node is congested in terms of occupied buff-
er space. The parameter needs to be tuned is 
not just the value of the threshold, but also the 
duration of the excess burst period. If the du-
ration is set too low, then the alternative rout-
ing path mechanism is triggered often. Buffer 
monitoring begins when the buffer occupancy 
of each node reaches half of the total. At this 
instance the affected node counts the number 
of nodes from which it is receiving packets. 
Then, it assumes that each node is transmitting 
with the maximum data rate and calculates 
the time until the buffer occupancy will reach 
the maximum limit. When this time elapses 
it checks again the occupancy of the buffer. If 
it is receiving packets with a higher rate than 
it can transmit and it triggers the alternative 
routing path mechanism to avoid congestion. 
If the buffer occupancy is less than maximum it 
re-calculates the remaining buffer and adjusts 
accordingly the time, which obviously is great-
ly reduced. It employs lightweight congestion 
detection scheme that able to face both perma-
nent congestion situations successfully.
4 Performance analysis
The proposed scheme has been implemented 
in network simulator (NS2). We evaluate the 
performance of proposed scheme and the oth-
er algorithms through extensive simulations. In 
the simulation, we evaluate the performance of 
proposed scheme in comparison with two other 
algorithms such as and HTAP and CADA [22]. 
100 nodes were randomly deployed in a 500 m 
500 m area of interest. The transmission range 
was 20 m. The Stackelberg Game Theory Model 
reduces the effectiveness of the congestion in 
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the network. The simulation results were stud-
ied by varying the network size from 50 to 200. 
Table 6 shows the parameter setting for simu-
lation of proposed scheme. With the objective 
of improving routing performance with relat-
ed approaches, we have modeled a Stackelberg 
Game Theory Model in terms of avoidance of 
congestion and select alternate path for rout-
ing. While in previous works were not provid-
ing alternate path while congestion occur in the 
network. 
Table 6: Parameter setting for simulation
Parameter value
Number of nodes 50,100,150,200
Access links of each user 5 Mb/s
Delay 10ms
Bandwidth 1500 Mb/s
Packet size 576 Bytes
Congestion windows size 70
[αi, βi] [1,0.9999]





We evaluate the average delay for varying data 
rate. Simulation results in Figure 2 depict that, 
when congestion occur, the proposed SGTM 
scheme starts increasing remarkable data rate 
in the network.  The proposed SGTM uses 
Stackelberg Game Theory Model to reduce 
the congestion by reducing data flow where 
the congestion occurs. On the other hand, the 
related schemes such as HTAP and CADA 
achieved an increased delay after 100 pkts/s 
since they have generated control packets lie 
ACK to reduce the congestion in the network. 
Also, there is a packets drop at this stage by 
overhead rose. We notice that the proposed 
SGTM presents less delay in the range of 4-5% 
because nodes exchange less control messages 
in comparison with related schemes. The pro-
posed SGTM introduces less overhead. The 
performance of SGTM is also enhanced than 
the related schemes. This means that the Stack-
elberg Game Theory Model pioneered in this 



























Figure 2: Average delay vs maximum data rate
4.2 Throughput
Figure 3 shows the throughput by varying the 
data rate in the network. It counts the actual 
number of packets that are received in desti-
nation. The proposed scheme SGTM scheme 
compared with related schemes HTAP and 
CADA in terms of throughput. It clearly shows 
that the proposed SGTM scheme are main-
tained higher throughput about 95% because 
the proposed scheme finds the alternate paths 
to forward the packets when congestion was 
occurring. A performance evaluation shows 
that the proposed SGTM scheme has bet-
ter capability of finding alternate routes with 
help of Stackelberg Game. Figure 3 shows that 
the throughput performance of the proposed 
SGTM scheme is more efficient than the re-
lated HTAP and CADA schemes. The related 
schemes has less throughput compare with 
proposed scheme. This parameter is a clear sign 
of the ability of the Stackelberg Game mod-
el to transmit a maximum number of packets 
to the destination. Figure 3 indicates that the 
percentage of received packets is decreasing for 
HTAP and TARA, compared to SGTM. It show 
a strong indication that the Stackelberg Game 
model provide large number of data packets, 
even when the congestion in the network is 
high. On the other hand, the related schemes 
lowers the number of packets transmitted to 
the destination.
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The routing overhead parameter is a sign of 
how the proposed scheme handles congestion 
and the overhead introduced by control pack-
et exchanges and number of routing packets 
(RTP). It is defined as number of routing pack-
ets transmitted for establishing alternate rout-
ing paths that caused minimum routing over-
head. Figure 4 clearly shows that the routing 
overhead caused by SGTM has transmitted less 
routing packets than related schemes. SGTM 
has transmitted average of 200 routing packets 
for forwarding packets in the selected alternate 
routing path. The related schemes had required 
more routing packets and control message ex-


























Figure 4: Routing overhead
4.4 Buffer level threshold
Figure 5 shows the received packets ratio of 
the proposed scheme and related schemes. In 
general, nodes in wireless network are used 
the buffer-based congestion technique. Con-
gestion occurs when a node receives packets 
with a higher rate than it can transmit. The 
proposed scheme received maximum packets 
in destination because each node is able to play 
or run Stackelberg game approach that produce 
leader and follower. Also, the proposed scheme 
uses correlated equilibrium that used to set a 
threshold for buffer. When the buffer reaches 
a threshold value, nodes start with reducing 
data rate that produce maximum packet flow 
in among the nodes. The related schemes lower 
the received packets because it does not follow 


























Figure 5: Buffer level threshold vs received packets 
ratio
4.5 Energy Consumption
Figure 8 shows the energy consumption of 
nodes for the proposed scheme and related 
schemes. It clearly noticed the energy efficiency 
of the proposed scheme. The energy consump-
tion is the sum of used energy of all the nodes 
for routing including transmitting, receiving, 
idling and sleeping in the network. As it is ex-
pected, STGM consume less energy since min-
imum control packets are introduced in the 
network. The related schemes consume more 
energy at the point where congestion occurs. 
This fact is justified by the operation of the pro-
posed STGM scheme control the congestion 
and reduces the overhead. The related schemes 
HTAP and CADA consume more energy since 
more nodes are involved for forwarding pack-
ets from the source to the destination. As we 
can see from Figure 4 this energy consump-
tion is rather negligible in comparison with the 
achieved throughput. 
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Figure 6: Energy Consumption vs number of nodes
As we conclude the performance evaluation 
section, we can state that the proposed STGM 
scheme provides an increased performance 
in terms of energy efficiency throughput and 
routing overhead in comparison with HTAP 
and CADA. Also, STGM outperforms in cer-
tain cases, which is Correlated equilibrium and 
finding alternate paths. The SGTM used game 
theory approach that was find leader and fol-
lower to reduce the congestion and increase 
the maximum packets to destination. As it 
is accepted, SGTM has proven crucial for the 
successful operation of it. Specifically, this en-
hancement improved the average delay, while 
the avoidance of congestion.
5 Conclusion
We have used a Stackelberg Game model to 
reveal the best correlated equilibrium of to 
minimize the congestion in network. A novel 
scheme of buffer level threshold or congestion 
cost is calculated for nodes. Buffer level thresh-
old is used to set the maximum data rate for 
nodes that reveals the best throughput. Each 
player or nodes is allocated utilities that de-
pend on its correlated equilibrium. The pro-
posed SGTM scheme find alternate path where 
at the congestion point. Then, SGTM found 
the leader and follower nodes in which the fol-
lowers are choose the leader’s strategy for for-
warding the packets. A packet can be forward-
ed through a congestion-free path when the 
leader chooses to alternate path, preventing a 
packet-dropping and congestion. This is a nov-
el way to enhance congestion-free routing and 
motivate the follower choose leader’s action. 
This game model also analyses the equilibrium 
strategy profiles for players based on its payoffs. 
It emphasizes reducing congestion by Buffer 
monitoring mechanism. It employs lightweight 
congestion detection scheme that able to face 
both permanent congestion situations success-
fully when it follows the correlated equilibri-
um strategy. Simulation results reveal that the 
correlated equilibrium strategies for players are 
better than pure or mixed strategies. To the best 
of our knowledge, this is the first work that uses 
the Stackelberg Game model for reducing con-
gestion in wireless network.
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